

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
LANDING of FORCES
Designed for the
INVASION of a COUNTRY.
WITH
ARGUMENTS

On the safest and most expedient COURSES
to be taken on that OCCASION ;

By Sir CLEMENT EDMONDS, Knt.

Whereupon are added,

Some ANIMADVERSIONS,

With several EXAMPLES and ARGUMENTS to
manifest the great ADVANTAGES of

A good FLEET in WAR

Between NATIONS divided by the SEA ;

And prove, that an Army may be landed in an Ene-
my's Country, unless they have a NAVAL POWER
able to oppose it.

By Sir WALTER RALEGH, Knt.

L O N D O N :

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INTRODUCTION.

IT becomes every Man that has the Welfare of his Country at Heart, to offer the Publick whatever may be conducive to its Safety, Honour or Interest. This cannot be better perform'd in Times of warlike Action, against a powerful, encroaching and blood-thirsty Enemy, who makes himself a general Incendiary, among all the Nations and Princes about him, than by reluminating as it were, and holding up anew, such *Lights of Direction*, as have been bequeathed us by Men of great Knowledge, Judgment and Experience; and may be as well seasonable as servicable, to the weakening and humbling such a restless, insolent, and implacable Monster of Ambition, as we have now to cope with, under the Powers of *France*.

For this Reason, I thought it would not at this juncture, be an unacceptable Present, to revive and set forth some *Observations* and *Arguments*, which had occasionally been used by Men of those distinguished Characters, upon the important Topic of *INVASION*.

Several able and famous Persons, who were active in the Wars against our *Spanish* Enemies, under the Reign of the renowned Queen *Elizabeth*, have written Tracts upon this Subject. Of these Authors Sir *Thomas Wilford*, was one, who I think was Muster-master of the Forces in *England* or *Holland*; and among whose Manuscripts there have been preserved one, or more Discourses upon *The prevention of an Enemy Invader*. *Thomas Digges*, Esq; also Muster-Master-General of the Army in the *Low-Countries*, wrote likewise in the latter end of the said Queen's Reign, *A Discourse of the best Order, for repulsing a Foreign Force*, &c. published, or republished, in the
Reign

INTRODUCTION.

Reign of King *Charles II.* under the Title of *England's Defence, a Treatise against Invasion.* And about Twenty Five Years since, was set forth by the late *Nathaniel Booth, Esq;* of *Grays-Inn,* a *Military Discourse: Whether it were better for England to give an Invader present Battle, or to temporise, and defer the same:* Found among Sir *Walter Raleigh's* Papers; and may contain some Arguments of his, as well as of those Authors before named.

But the Discourses here chosen to be revived, are those in Sir *Clement Edmonds* his *Observations* on the *Commentaries* of *Julius Cæsar,* and Sir *Walter Raleigh's* Digression of *historical Examples* and *Arguments* occasioned by the same, at the beginning of the fifth Book, in his *History of the World:* wherein his Allusions to, and Animadversions upon the said *Arguments* of Sir *Clement* in those *Observations,* render this Connection more necessary, as it was never made before in Print, for the readier and more commodious Consultation of both, or either of them.

As for the *Arguments* on the other Side, or reverse of the Question, upon the most expedient Method, for ourselves to become successful Invaders of an Enemy; they may partly reflect or be deduced from the Courses recommended on this Side to be taken, of repelling an Invader with Success; but more especially, from those *Instructions* and *Directions* which may be the happy result of our fresher and later Experience; which, wherever they shall break out into Practice, it must be the Prayers of all true and honest *Englishmen,* that it may be so effectual, as to conclude, and crown our War, with a prosperous, honourable, and permanent Peace.

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
OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

LANDING of FORCES

Designed for the

INVASION of a COUNTRY.

 UPON this Circumstance
of *landing*, I may justly
take Occasion to handle
that Controversy which
hath been often debated by our *English*
Captains; which is, Whether it be better
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in Question of an Invasion, and in the Absence of our Shipping, to oppose an Enemy at his landing upon our Coasts, or quietly to suffer him to set his Men on Shore, and retire our Forces into some inland Place, and there attend to give him Battle? It seemeth that such as first set this Question on Foot, and were of an Opinion that *we ought not*, by any Means, *to encounter an Enemy at his landing*, for so we might much endanger ourselves and our Country, did ground themselves upon the Authority of *Monsieur de Langey*, not observing the Difference between an *Island* and a *Continent*. For where he setteth down that Position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as Border one upon another in the same Continent: but where their Territories are disjoined by so great a Bar as the Ocean, and they have not such means to surprize one another, it were mere Folly to hold good that Rule, as shall better appear by the Sequel of this Discourse; wherein

I will *first* lay down the *Reasons* that may be urged *to prove it unsafe to oppose an Enemy at his landing*, not as being urged by that Party (for I never heard any probable Motive from them which might induce any such Opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the Controversies, both with Experience and good Judgment.

And first, it may be objected, that it is a hard Matter to resist an Enemy at his landing, as well in Regard of the Uncertainty of Place as of Time: for being ignorant in what Place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all Places of Access, or our Intentions will prove mere frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive Forces be sufficient according to the particular Quality of every Place subject to Danger; which considering the large Extension of our maritime Parts, and the many Landing-Places on our Coast,

will require a greater Number of Men than this Island can afford. And altho' it could furnish such a competent Number as might seem in some Sort sufficient, yet the Uncertainty of the Time of the Enemy's Arrival would require that they should be lodged either upon, or near the Places of Danger many Days at least, if not many Weeks, before the Instant of the Attempt; which would exhaust a greater Mass of Treasure than could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected, that all our Landing-places are of such Disadvantage for the Defendants, that it were no Safety at all to make Head against him at the landing: For inasmuch as such Places are open and plain, they yield no Commodity to shelter the Defendants from the Fury of the Artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their Long-boats and landing Vessels; which beaten from the Beach (for most
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of our Landing Places are of that Quality) will so scatter them, that no Man shall be able to endure the Inconvenience thereof.

The third Objection may arise from the Disparity both of Numbers and Condition of the Forces of either Party. For the first it must needs be granted, that the Defendants, being to guard so many Places at once, cannot furnish such Numbers to every particular Place for Defence, as the Assailants may for Offence.

Concerning the Quality of the Forces, it is without Question, that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertaketh to invade the Territories of so absolute and well-obeyed a Princess as her Majesty is) would draw out the Flower of his Soldiery where-soever; besides the gallant Troops of Voluntaries which do commonly attend such Services. Now these being thus
qualified

qualified, and drawn unto one Head, and being to make as it were but one Body ; How can it be reasonably imagined (the Time and Place of their Attempt being uncertain) that the Defendants, should equal them with Forces of like Virtue and Experience.

These are the Reasons which may be drawn from the Disadvantage which they have, that go about to oppose an Enemy at his Landing : The rest that have been urged by such as maintain this Opinion, are either impertinent to the Question, or taken altogether from false Grounds. But before I proceed to the Answer of these Reasons, I will lay this down for a Principle, that it is impossible for any foreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a Preparation as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dissemble the same) but it must
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of necessity be discovered, before it can be made able to put any thing into Execution ; which I might enlarge, by particularizing the infinite Equipage, which is required for so great a Fleet. But I will rest myself in the Example of the Year Eighty-eight, which proveth the Discovery of the pretended Invasion, before it could come to Execution.

Concerning therefore the first Objection ; it cannot indeed be denied, but the place of an Enemy's landing will be doubtful ; and therefore our Care must generally extend itself to all Places of Access : But that our defensive Forces, are not sufficient in a competent Manner, to guard all such Places, according as the Necessity of them shall require, that is the Point in Question.

To prove that our Forces are sufficient,

cient, we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take *Kent* for a President, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which if I deceive not myself, is a Shore of a large Extension upon the maritime Parts, as any other within this Kingdom. For the Breadth thereof, enlarging itself from the point of *Ness* by *Lyd*, which is the uttermost Skirt upon the Coast of *Sussex*, unto *Margate*, upon the Coast of *Essex*, is by computation about twenty four Miles: But notwithstanding this large Circuit, who knoweth not, that the sixth Part thereof, is not subject to the landing of such an Enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugeness of the Cliffs, which do inclose a great Part of that Skirt, and partly in regard that much of that Quantity which may be landed upon, hath such imminent and difficult Places near adjoining, as an Army that should put itself there on Shore, should find itself, being

ing opposed but by a small Force, so streightened, as they would not easily find a Way out, without apparent Ruin of their whole Forces.

Further, it cannot be denied, but that generally along the Coast of *Kent*, there are so many Rocks, Shelves, Flats, and other impediments, that a Navy of great Ships can have no Commodoty to Anchor near the Shore ; and for the most Part, the Coast lieth so open to the Weather, that the least Gale of Wind will put them from their Anchor ; all which particularities duly considered, it will appear, that this large Skirt of *Kent*, will afford a far less Part fit for the landing of an Army, than was thought of at the first. And were it that so publick a Treatise as this is, would admit with good Discretion, such an exact Relation as falleth within my Knowledge concerning this Point ; I would undertake to make

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it so evident, by the particular Description both of the Number, Quantity, and Quality of the Places themselves, as no Man of an indifferent Judgment, would imagine our Forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure Guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular Satisfaction, in this publick Discourse, give me leave, submitting myself always to better Judgments, to give a general Taste of that Means, as would secure all Places with a competent Number of Men.

Having shewed you before the Circuit of the maritime Parts of *Kent*, I would observe this Order: First, to make a triple Division of all such Forces as shall be appointed for this Service; as for Example, I will suppose the Number to be twelve Thousand, of which I would lodge three Thousand

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about the Point of *Nefs*, and three Thousand about *Margate*, and six Thousand about *Foulkstone*, which I take to be as it were the Centre; for my greatest Care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same Shire, but as every Shire bordereth one upon another, so they should mutually give help one unto another, as Occasion should be offered: As if an Enemy should attempt a landing about *Nefs*, not only the six Thousand lodged as before, should march to their Succours, but such also of the *Sussex* Forces, as were near unto that Part, and so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a Force would in a few Hours be assembled, for the reinforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole Forces are thus lodged in the Centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all

Parts, than any other Place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them, an especial Care be had to the Places of Danger, as might be answerable to the Importance thereof: For my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the Coast by Regiments and Companies, as the Country might afford best Opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the latter Part of this Objection, which urgeth the uncertainty of Time, when the Enemy shall make his Approaches; I hold it most requisite, that our defensive Forces should be drawn into a Head, before the Enemy should be discovered near our Coast, ready to put himself on Shore: For it were a gross Absurdity to imagine, that Companies could upon such a sudden be assembled, without Confusion; and make so long a
March,

March, with such Expedition as the necessity of the Occasion would require. Now for that husbanding Respect of her Majesty's Coffers, which is urged to such Extremity, as it would be unsupportable for this State to bear, as I doubt not but good Intelligence would much qualify that supposed immoderate Expence; so I assure myself, that Men of sound Judgment, will deem it much out of Season to dispute about unnecessary Thrift, when the whole Kingdom is brought into Question of being made Subject to a Stranger.

Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones:

Non expergisceris, ut te ipsum serves?

Thieves rise by Night to cut the Throats of Men:

Wilt not thou then arise to save thyself?

The Enemy (peradventure) hath kept
thirty Thousand Men in Pay two
Months

Months before, to make Havock of our Country, and to bring us into perpetual Thralldom ; shall we think it much to maintain sufficient Forces upon our Coast, to assure ourselves, that no such Enemy shall enter into our Country ? The extremity of this Charge, would be qualified by our good Espial, which would proportion our Attendance, with the Necessity which is imposed upon us, to be careful in Business of this Nature. Let this suffice therefore, to prove that our Forces are sufficient to keep the Sea Coast, and that the uncertainty of Time, when the Enemy will make his Attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that Duty, which the Care and Respect of our Prince and Country, imposeth upon every good Subject ; which is the Substance of the first Reason, which I set down in the beginning of this Discourse.

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Now concerning the second Reason, which urgeth the disadvantage of the Place in regard of the Fury of the Enemy's Artillery; true it is, that such Places as yield the Enemy Commodity of landing, are for the most Part plain and open, and afford naturally no Cover at all. What then? Shall a Soldier take every Place as he findeth it, and use no Art to qualify the Disadvantages thereof? Or shall a Man forego the Benefit of a Place of Advantage, rather than he will relieve with Industry the discommodity of some particular Circumstance? I make no Question, but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable Time lodged, with convenient Forces upon any of those Places, yea upon the Beach itself, which is as unapt to make defensible, as any Place whatsoever, would use such Industry, as might give sufficient Security to his Forces, and over-weigh the Enemy with Advan-

Advantage of Place ; especially considering that this Age hath afforded such plentiful Examples of admirable Inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our Forces do not make Head before the instant of the Enemy's Attempt, that our Commanders may have some Time to make ready Store of Gabions, and Hand-baskets, with such moveable Matter, as shall be thought fit for that Service.

Neither let this trouble any Man ; for I dare avouch it, that if our Forces are not drawn into a Head, before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some Inland-Place to give them Battle ; our Commanders will be far to seek of many important Circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that Consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable Time to bethink ourselves of these
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Necessaries, and we will easily overcome all these Difficulties, and use the Benefit of the firm Land to repel an Enemy, weakened with the Sea, toss'd with the Billow, troubled with his Weapons, with many other Hindrances and Discouragements, which are presented unto him, both from the Land and the Sea. He that had the landing of our Forces in the Island of *Fiall*, in the Year *Ninety Seven*, can somewhat judge of the Difficulty of that Matter; for what with the working of the Sea, the steepness of the Cliffs, and the troublesome-ness of their Arms, the Soldiers were so incumbered, that had not the Enemy been more than a Coward, he might well with two Hundred Men, have kept us from entering any Part of that Island.

Concerning the third Objection, this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our Forces

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do equal them in Number, as to see that they be sufficient for the Nature of the Place, to make it good against the Enemy's landing ; for we know that in Places of Advantage, and difficult Access, a small Number is able to oppose a great ; and we doubt not, but all Circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionably equal the Enemy, both in Number and Quality of their Forces : always presupposed, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient Forces, trained and exercised in a competent Manner, to defend their Country from foreign Enemies. For, the neglect thereof, were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a Prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemy's Landing, but to defend ourselves from being over-run, as other Nations living in Security, without due Regard thereof, have been.

And thus much concerning the Answer

swer to those three Reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his Landing. Now if we do but look a little into the discommodities which follow upon the Landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of this Opinion: As first, we give him leave to live upon the Spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any wasting, or spoiling, or retiring of our Provisions, in so plentiful a Country as this is, especially considering, that we have no strong Towns at all to repose ourselves upon. Whereof we need no further Testimony, than is delivered unto us out of the seventh Book of those Commentaries on that War which *Cæsar* had with *Vercingetorix*.

Secondly, Obedience, which at other Times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakened at such Times; whereby all necessary Means to maintain a War, is hardly drawn from the Subject.


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Thirdly,

Thirdly, Opportunity is given to Malecontents and ill-disposed Persons, either to make Head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy.

Fourthly, 'tis madness to adventure a Kingdom upon one Stroke, having it in our Disposition to do otherwise : With many other Disadvantages, which the Opportunity of any such Occasion will discover.

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G R E A T A D V A N T A G E
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G O O D F L E E T i n W A R ,
B E T W E E N
N A T I O N S d i v i d e d b y t h e S E A .

IN old Example we have of
A that great Advantage of trans-
porting Armies by Water,
between *Canutus* and *Ed-*
mund Ironside. For *Canutus*, when he
had entered the *Thames* with his Navy
and

and Army, and could not prevail against *London*, suddenly embarked, and sailing to the West, landed in *Dorsetshire*; so drawing *Edmund* and his Army thither, there finding ill Entertainment, he again shipped his Men, and entered the *Severn*, making *Edmund* to march after him, to the Succour of *Worcestershire*, by him greatly spoiled. But when he had *Edmund* there, he sailed back again to *London*: By Means whereof, he both wearied the King, and spoiled where he pleased, ere Succour could arrive. And this was not the least Help, which the *Netherlands* have had against the *Spaniards*, in the Defence of their Liberty, that being Masters of the Sea, they could pass their Army from *Place* to *Place*, unwearied and entire, with the Munition and Artillery belonging to it, in the tenth Part of the Time, where their Enemies have been able to do. Of this an Instance or two: the Count *Maurice of Nassau*, now living, one

the greatest Captains, and one of the
 worthiest Princes, that either the present
 or preceding Ages have brought forth,
 in the Year 1590, carried his Army by
 Sea, with forty Cannons to *Breda*: Mak-
 ing Countenance either to besiege *Bois-
 le-duc*, or *Gertreviden Berg*; which the
 Enemy (in prevention) filled with Sol-
 diers and Victuals. But as soon as the
 Wind served, he suddenly set sail, arriv-
 ing in the Mouth of the *Meuze*, turned
 up the *Rhine*, and thence to *Yssel*, and
 set down before *Zutphen*. So before the
Spaniards could march over-land round
 about *Holland*, above fourscore Miles,
 and over many great Rivers, with their
 Cannon and Carriage, *Zutphen* was taken.
 Again, when the *Spanish* Army had over-
 come this wearisome March, and were
 not far from Home, Prince *Maurice*,
 making Countenance to sail up the *Rhine*,
 changed his Course in the Night, and
 sailing down the Stream, he was set down
 before *Hulst* in *Brabant*, ere the *Spa-
 niards*

niards had Knowledge what was become of him. So this Town he also took, before the *Spanish* Army could return. Lastly, the *Spanish* Army was no sooner arrived in *Brabant*, than Prince *Maurice*, well attended by his good *Fleet*, having fortified *Hulst*, set sail again, and presented himself before *Nymegen* in *Gelders*, a City of notable Importance, and mastered it.

And to say the truth, it is impossible for any maritime Country not having the Coasts admirably fortified, to defend itself against a powerful Enemy, that is Master of the Sea. Hereof I had rather that *Spain* than *England* should be an Example. Let it therefore be supposed that King *Philip* the Second had fully resolved to hinder Sir *John Norris* in the Year 1589, from presenting Don *Antonio*, King of *Portugal*, before the Gate of *Lisbon*; and that he would have kept off the *English*, by Power of his Land forces

forces ; as being too weak at Sea, thro' the great Overthrow of his mighty *Armado*, by the Fleet of Queen *Elizabeth*, in the Year foregoing. Surely, it had not been hard for him, to prepare an Army, that should be able to resist our Eleven Thousand. But where should this his Army have been bestowed ? If about *Lisbon*, then would it have been easy unto the *English* to take, ransack, and burn the Town of *Groin*, and to waste the Country round about it : For the great and threatening Preparations of the Earl of *Altemira*, the Marquis of *Seralba*, and others, did not hinder them from performing all this. Neither did the hasty Levy of eight Thousand under the Earl of *Andrada* serve to more Effect, than the Increase of Honour to Sir *John Norris*, and his Associates : Considering that the *English* charged these, at *Puente de Burgos*, and passing the great Bridge, behind which they lay, that was flanked with shot, and

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barricadoed at the further End, routed them, took their Camp, took their general Standard, with the King's Arms, and pursued them all over the Country, which they fired. If a Royal Army, and not (as this was) a Company of private Adventurers, had thus begun the War in *Galicia*; I think it would have made the *Spaniards* quit the Guard of *Portugal*, and make Haste to the Defence of their *St. Jago*, whose Temple was not far from the Danger. But had they held their first Resolution, as knowing, that Sir *John Norris* his main Intent was, to bring *Don Antonio*, with an Army into his Kingdom; whither coming strong, he expected to be readily and joyfully welcomed; could they have hindered his landing in *Portugal*? Did not he land at *Penicha*, and march over the Country to *Lisbon*, six Days Journey? Did not he (when all *Don Antonio* his Promises failed) pass along by the River of *Lisbon* to *Cascaliz*; and there,

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having

having won the Fort, quietly embarked his Men, and departed? But these no more than an Handful, yet were they *Englishmen*.

Let us consider of the Matter itself; [what another Nation might do, even against *England*, in landing an Army, by Advantage of a Fleet, if we had none: This Question, *Whether an invading Army may be resisted at their landing upon the Coast of England, were there no Fleet of ours to impeach it*, is already handled by a learned Gentleman of our Nation, in his *Observations upon Cæsar's Commentaries*, that maintains the Affirmative. This he holds only upon Supposition; *in Absence of our Shipping*: And comparatively, as that it is a more safe and easy Course, to defend all the Coast of *England*, than to suffer any Enemy to land, and afterwards to fight with him. Surely I hold with him, that it is the best way to keep our Enemies from treading upon our Ground;

wherein, if we fail, then must we seek to make him wish, that he had staid at his own home. In such a Case if it should happen, our Judgments are to weigh many particular Circumstances, that belongs not unto this Discourse. But making the Question general, and positive, *Whether England, without the Help of her Fleet, be able to debar an Enemy from landing*, I hold that it is unable so to do. And therefore I think it most dangerous to make the Adventure. For the Encouragement of a first Victory to an Enemy, and the Discouragement of being beaten to the Invaded, may draw after it a most perilous Consequence.

It is true, that the Marshal *Monluc*, in his *Commentaries*, doth greatly complain, that by his wanting Forces, wherewith to have kept the Frontiers of *Guyenne*, they of the *Protestant* Religion, after the Battle of *Moncontour*, entered that Country, and gathered great Strength
and

and Relief thence ; for if the King (saith he) would have gained me but reasonable Means, *J'eusse bien gardé a Monsieur l'Admiral de fair boire ses Chevaux en la Garonne* ; I would have kept the Admiral from watering his Horses in the River of Garonne. Monsieur de Langey, on the contrary Side, prefers the not fighting upon a Frontier with an invading Enemy, and commends the Delay ; which Cause the Constable of France held against the Emperor Charles, when he invaded Provence. Great Difference I know there is, and a diverse Consideration to be had, between such a Country as France is, strengthened with many fortified Places, and this of ours, where our Ramparts are but of the Bodies of Men. And it was of Invasions upon firm Land that these great Captains spake, whose Entrances cannot be uncertain. But our Question is, *An Army to be transported over Sea, and to be landed again in an Enemy's Country, and the Place left to the*
Choice

Choice of the Invader? Hereunto I say, that such an Army cannot be resisted on the Coast of *England* without a Fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the Coast of *France*, or any other Country; except every Creek, or Port, or Sandy Bay, had a powerful Army each of them, to make Opposition. For let his whole Supposition be granted, that *Kent* is able to furnish *Twelve thousand* Foot, and those *Twelve Thousand* be laid in the three best landing Places within that Country; to wit, three Thousand at *Margate*, three Thousand at the *Ness*, and Six Thousand at *Folkstone*, which is somewhat equally distant from them both; as also that two of these Troops (unless some other Order be thought more fit) be directed to strengthen the third, when they shall see the Enemy's Fleet to bend towards it: I say, that notwithstanding this Provision, if the Enemy, setting sail from the Isle of *Wight*, in the first watch of the Night, and towing their Long-Boats

Boats, at their Stems, shall arrive by Dawn of Day at the *Nefs*, and thrust their Army on Shore there; it will be hard for those three Thousand that are at *Margate* (twenty and four long Miles from thence) to come Time enough to reinforce their Fellows at the *Nefs*. Nay, how should they at *Folkstone* be able to do it, who are nearer by more than half the Way? Seeing that the Enemy, at his first Arrival, will either make his Entrance by Force, with three or four Hundred Shot of Artillery, and quickly put the first three Thousand that were intrenched at the *Nefs*, to run; or else give them so much to do, that they should be glad to send for Help to *Folkstone*, and perhaps to *Margate*: whereby those Places will be left bare. Now let us suppose that all these twelve Thousand *Kentish* Soldiers arrive at the *Nefs*, ere the Enemy can be ready to disembark his Army, so that he will find it unsafe, to land in the Face of so many, prepared to

to withstand him ; yet must we believe that he will play the best of his own Game, (having Liberty to go which Way he list) under Cover of the Night, set sail towards the East, where, what shall hinder him to take Ground, either at *Margate*, the *Downs*, or elsewhere, before they at the *Nefs* can be well aware of his Departure? Certainly, there is nothing more easy than to do it; yea, the like may be said of *Weymouth*, *Purbeck*, *Poole*, and of all landing Places on the South Coast. For there is no Man ignorant, that *Ships*, without putting themselves out of *Breath*, will easily out-run the *Soldiers* that *coast* them: *Les Armées ne volent point en poste; Armies neither fly nor run post*, saith a Marshal of *France*. And I know it to be true, that a Fleet of *Ships* may be seen at Sunset and after it, at the *Lizard*, yet by the next Morning they may recover *Portland*; whereas an Army of Foot shall not be able to march it in six Days. Again, when those

those Troops lodged on the Sea-shores, shall be forced to run from Place to Place in vain, after a Fleet of Ships; they will at length set down in the Midway, and leave all at Adventure. But say it were otherwise, that the invading Enemy will offer to land in some such Place, where there shall be an Army of ours ready to receive him; yet it cannot be doubted, but that when the choice of all our trained Bands, and the choice of our Commanders and Captains, shall be drawn together (as they were at *Tilbury* in the Year 1588) to attend the Person of the Prince, and for the Defence of the City of *London*; they that remain to guard the Coast, can be of no such Force, as to encounter an Army like unto that wherewith it was intended, that the Prince of *Parma* should have landed in *England*.

The Isle of *Tercera*, hath taught us by Experience, what to think in such a

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Case. There are not many Islands in the World, better fenced by Nature, and strengthened by Art, it being every where hard of Access; having no good Harbour wherein to shelter a Navy of Friends, and upon every Cove, or watering Place a Fort erected, to forbid the Approach of an Enemy's Boat. Yet when *Emanuel de Sylva*, and *Monsieur de Chattes*, that held it to the Use of *Don Antonio*, with five or six Thousand Men, thought to have kept the *Marquiss* of *Santa Cruz*, from setting Foot on Ground therein, the *Marquiss* having shew'd himself in the Road of *Angra*, did set sail, ere any was aware of it, and arrived at the *Port des Moles*, far distant from thence; where he won a Fort, and landed, ere *Monsieur de Chattes*, running thither in vain, could come to hinder him. The Example of *Philip Strossie*, slain the Year before, without all Regard of his Worth; and of three Hundred *French* Prisoners murdered

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ed in cool Blood, had instructed *de Chat-tes*, and his Followers, what they might expect at that *Marquiss's* Hands : Therefore it is not like, that they were slow in carrying in Relief to *Port des Moles*. Whether our *English* would be persuaded to make such diligent Haste, from *Margate*, to the *Nefs*, and back again, it may be doubted. Sure I am, that it were a greater March than all the length of *Tercera* ; whereof the *Frenchmen* had not measured the one half ; when they found themselves prevented by the more nimble Ships of *Spain*.

This may suffice to prove, that a strong Army, in a good Fleet, which neither Foot nor Horse is able to follow, cannot be denied to land where it list, in *England*, *France*, or elsewhere ; unless it be hindered, encountered, and shuffled together, by a Fleet of equal or answerable Strength.

The difficult Landing of our *English* at *Fayal*, in the Year 1597, is alledged against this : Which Example moves me no way to think, that a large Coast may be defended against a strong Fleet. I landed those *English* in *Fayal* myself; and therefore ought to take Notice of this Instance. For whereas I find an Action of mine cited, with Omission of my Name ; I may by a civil Interpretation, think there was no Purpose to Defraud me of my Honour ; but rather an Opinion, that the Enterprize was such, or so ill managed, as that no Honour could be due unto it. There were indeed some which were in that Voyage, who advised me not to undertake it : And I harkened unto them somewhat longer than was requisite ; especially, whilst they desired me to reserve the Title of such an Exploit (though it were not great) for a greater Person. But when they began to tell me of Difficulty, I gave them to understand the same which

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I now maintain, that, *it was more difficult to defend a Coast, than to Invade it.* The Truth is, that I could have landed my Men with more Ease than I did; yea without finding any Resistance, if I would have rowed to another Place; yea even there were I landed, if I would have taken more Company to help me. But, without fearing any Imputation of Rashness, I may say, that I had more Regard of Reputation in that Business, than of Safety. For I thought it to belong unto our Prince and Nation, that a few Islanders should not think any Advantage great enough, against a Fleet set forth by *Q. Elizabeth*: And further, I was unwilling, that some *Low Country* Captains, and others, not of mine own Squadron, whose assistance I had refused, should please themselves with a sweet Conceit (though it would have been short, when I had landed in some other Place) *That for want of their Help I was driven to turn Tail.* There I took with me none, but Men assured, Commanders of my
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own Squadron, with some of their Followers, and a few other Gentlemen, Voluntaries, whom I could not refuse; as, Sir *William Brooke*, Sir *William Harvey*, Sir *Arthur Gorges*, Sir *John Scot*, Sir *Thomas Ridgway*, Sir *Henry Thynne*, Sir *Charles Morgan*, Sir *Walter Chute*, *Marcellus Throckmorton*, Captain *Laurence Kemeys*, Captain *William Morgan*, and others; such as well understood themselves and the Enemy: By whose Help, with God's Favour, I made good the Enterprize I undertook. As for the *working of the Sea, the steepness of the Cliffs*, and other Troubles that were not new to us, we overcame them well enough: And these (notwithstanding) made five or six Companies of the Enemy's, that sought to Impeach our Landing, abandon the Wall, whereon their Musketters lay on the Rest for us, and won the Place of them without any great Loss. This I could have done with less Danger; so it should not have served for Example of a Rule, that failed even in
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this Example : But the Reasons before alledged (together with other Reasons well known to some of the Gentlemen above named, though more private than to be here laid down) made me rather follow the Way of Bravery, and take the shorter Course ; having it still in my own Power to fall off when I should think it meet. It is easily said, that *the Enemy was more than a Coward* ; (which yet is more than we knew) neither will I magnify such a small Piece of Service, by seeking to prove him better ; whom had I thought equal to mine own Followers, I would otherwise have dealt with. But for so much as concerns the Proposition in Hand, he that beheld this, may well remember that the same Enemy troubled us more in our March towards *Fayal*, than in our taking the Shore ; that he sought how to stop us in a Place of his Advantage ; that many of our Men were slain and hurt by him, among whom Sir *Arthur Gorges* was Shot in that March ; and that

that such as (thinking all Danger to be past, when we had won good Footing) would needs follow us to the Town, were driven by him, to forsake the Place of a Man of War, and betake themselves to an hasty Trot.

For end of this Digression, I hope that this Question shall never come to a Tryal; his Majesty's many moveable Forts, will forbid the Experience, and although *the English will no less disdain, than any Nation under Heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own Ground, or elsewhere, by a foreign Enemy*; yet to entertain those that shall assail us, with their own Beef in their Bellies, and before they eat of our *Kentish Capons*, I take it to be the wisest Way. To do which, his Majesty after God, will employ his good Ships on the Sea, and not trust to any Intrenchment upon the Shore.

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